

Determinants of International Cooperation

Syllabus

Module “Selected Topics in International Relations”

University of Mannheim, Fall 2019

Course Details: Mondays, 15.30 – 17.00
Room B 143 in A5, 6

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Office: A 351 in A 5, 6

Office Hours: Tuesdays, 12:00 – 13:00 (please let me know via e-mail)

1 Course Description

The course focuses on the determinants and results of international cooperation. Key questions are: Why do states cooperate in international agreements and organizations? How do they design these agreements and organizations? What are the drivers of cooperation? When does cooperation fail? The 14 sessions of this course are structured in four blocks. First, we will discuss the theoretical foundations of scholarship on international cooperation (1). Then we will turn to international organizations (2) and international agreements (3). In a final substantive block we will look at the failure of cooperation and the results of failed cooperation (4). The last sessions of the course will allow students to present their own research ideas in order to receive feedback on their final papers.

2 Course Objectives

This course will provide students with an understanding of the theoretical and methodological background that enables them to conduct their own empirical analyses in the field of international cooperation. Besides familiarising students with the current state of research in the field as well as the research designs and methods political scientists have used to address these topics, this course will encourage students to critically discuss and evaluate the literature and develop and answer their own empirical research question. To facilitate this process, students will have the opportunity to present their research proposals in class and receive written feedback from a fellow student and the instructor.

3 Organizational information

3.1 Classroom Policies and Procedures

E-mail: All e-mails concerning this course will be sent to your university e-mail address (username@mail.uni-mannheim.de) via ILIAS. Please make sure to regularly check the inbox or that e-mails

get forwarded in order to not miss important information. When e-mailing me, please add “[HS IB I HWS19]” in the beginning of the e-mail’s subject. I will try to respond in a timely fashion (48 hours or less).

Attendance: Even though attendance in lectures and seminars is not mandatory anymore I strongly encourage you to regularly attend the course and participate in class since we will discuss and practice the material and skills that are necessary to successfully complete the course. Note that I will not re-explain course contents etc. in my office hour if you have been absent from class at an above-average rate without cause.

While not obligatory, it would be kind if you could inform me of any absences so I can adjust planning of the seminar sessions accordingly.

Technology policy: This class is structured to promote discussion. Cell phones and computers can have the tendency to obstruct classroom discussion when used inappropriately. Technology, however, can also be useful to engage with the material. I suggest using technology in a responsible way while in class. Hence, your laptop/tablet – if necessary – should only be used for note taking and retrieving and reviewing articles. Please make sure that your mobile phones are muted or switched off.

Students with disabilities or chronic illness: Contact me or the Studienbüro if you need special assistance because of disabilities or chronic illness. Please do so early in the semester so we can immediately make the appropriate accommodations.

Late work policy: In general, I will not allow extensions on any of the assessments. Start early with them, so you do not run into time issues once the deadline approaches. However, should you find yourself in a situation where you will not be able to turn something in on time, please advise me of this as soon as you can, and *not* the day the task is due or afterwards, We will work together to come up with a solution.

3.2 Assessment

It is expected that students participate regularly and actively in the seminar. Assessment is comprised of a “Prüfungsleistung” and several “Studienleistungen”. Note that the paper presentation, the response papers, the submission and presentation of a research proposal as well as the written and oral discussion of another student’s proposal must be completed and passed in order to participate at the final examination (term paper). Non-accomplishment or failure lead to an exclusion from the final examination and consequently to failure of this seminar.

Students will be evaluated on the basis of the following components:

Term Paper (= “Prüfungsleistung”)

The term paper (length: 4000–5000 words, excl. figures, tables, references and appendix; font: Times New Roman or equivalent; font size: 12pt; double spacing; margins: 2.5cm) should focus on answering a scientific research question concerning international cooperation or the institutional design of international agreements or international organizations. In doing so, students are expected to apply existing theories and explanations and to test them empirically using quantitative or qualitative methods. Whereas case selection is particularly important for quantitative methods, particular attention should be paid to the correct specification of the statistical model.

If you feel like you need help with finding or developing a topic or research question, please make an appointment for my office hours.

Term papers have to be handed in the latest by Sunday, **January 5**. **The term paper has to handed in as an electronic copy (pdf-upload via ILIAS including dataset and other replication materials). In addition, you have to hand in the statutory declaration as a paper copy.** Should you fail to submit a term paper by the above mentioned deadline or submit an insufficient term paper, you will receive the grade 5.0 (fail). It is not possible to retake the term paper since it is part of the overall assessment, which is only able to be retaken in its entirety in one of the following semesters.

“Studienleistungen”

- **Completion of the assigned reading and active participation:** This class is a seminar and therefore focuses on the in-depth discussion of the materials. Hence, it is necessary that you complete the required reading by class time each week and come prepared to engage in the discussion of each text.

It is very helpful to compose your own overview of the material (see “Article Overview” suggestions below) to prepare for class. You do not need to be an expert on all the topics of the assigned material, but you should at least come to class with questions that clarify at least one aspect of the material. The goal is to develop a collective understanding of the assigned material together with your colleagues. For each article, you should know the purpose, the contribution, the argument, the analyses and the conclusions. Thus, when reading the material, do not only try to read through and understand it, but also analyse it critically. Is the author(s)’ argument clear? Does the research design for testing the hypotheses make sense? Which method/cases/data/variables have been chosen and is this choice plausible? The question should go beyond mere questions for clarification, but should be suitable for a discussion of the readings and demonstrate that you have done the readings.

Article Presentation. Each student will briefly present one of the compulsory readings in ten to fifteen minutes before we discuss the respective reading in class. The goal of these presentations is to give an overview of the article and present two (or more) discussion questions. I suggest to take the article overview list below as a starting point.

Below is a suggestion of aspects to know for each article. This list is neither exhaustive nor will all aspects apply to every reading, however, it offers a guide for reading through the material. Be concise.

- Full citation
- Overview: Give a brief overview of the article, including your assessment.
- Purpose: What do(es) the author(s) propose to do? What is their research question?
- Prior literature: How did we get to this point in the literature?
- Gap: What is the gap in the prior literature?
- Contribution: Is the contribution theoretical, empirical, or both? Describe it.
- Argument: List the assumptions and describe the argument.
- Implications: List the hypotheses.
- Research methods: Do(es) the author(s) use quantitative or qualitative evidence? Describe the methods.

- Results: Describe the results from the analyses.
 - Conclusions: What are the conclusions from the reading? How well does the author contribute to the stated purpose?
- **Response papers on selected seminar topics:** You are expected to write *three* short response papers throughout the semester (between Week 5 and Week 12). The response papers should help you to become more familiar with the discussions in the literature and identify a research question. Therefore, you pick for yourselves in which weeks you want to submit a response paper. Your response paper should answer the following questions: What are the readings' main arguments? What is the logic behind the authors' argument? Is the logic explained well and is the research question interesting and solves a theoretical or empirical puzzle? Where does this research fit into the literature and where does it make a contribution? What empirical results do the authors find and what is their research design? What contributions does the empirical work provide and what are possible extensions one could make in light of their findings? Finally, work hard at thinking about what remains puzzling or unexplored by the author(s).
Use your notes with answers to the above questions to tie the readings together, within and across the weekly topics, to synthesize for the purpose of discussion and, more important, to generate your own original ideas.
Response papers should be about about 750 words in length (+/- 10%) and submitted via ILIAS by the **Saturday 23:59 preceding the sessions** for which you want to submit a response paper.
- **Submission and presentation of research proposal:** You are expected to hand in a (minimum) 750 word research proposal for the term paper via ILIAS by Sunday, **November 10**. It should describe the puzzle/research question, working hypotheses and the methods (and possibly data) you are planning to use.
Each student will then give a five minute presentation of their term paper idea at the “mini-conference” in Weeks 13 and 14. We will discuss the format of these presentations in class in Week 12.
The students who are not presenting are expected to function as an audience, asking questions and providing constructive feedback to the presenter.
- **Written and oral discussion of another student's research proposal:** You are expected to give one of your fellow students feedback on their research proposal. This feedback takes the form of a 500 word written piece, based on which you give about a five minute discussion of that student's presentation in the “mini-conference”. I will assign discussants after the research proposals have been submitted.
As in the response papers, you want to examine how the author answers the following questions: What are the proposal's main arguments? What is the logic behind the author's argument? Is the logic explained well and is the research question interesting and solves a theoretical or empirical puzzle? Where does this research fit into the literature and where does it make a contribution? In addition, you are expected to not only point out areas of weakness but also make helpful suggestions and tell the author where he or she is doing a good job.
The written discussion is due in person in class on the day of the respective presentation on which you act as a discussant (one copy for the author, one copy for me).

4 Outline

Session 1: Introduction

Discussion of the course and explanation of the expectations.

No readings

Session 2: Bargaining in International Relations

Introducing the bargaining model as a foundation for the course.

- Fearon, J. (1998). Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization*, 52(2), 269-305.
- Powell, R. (2002). Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5(1), 1–30.

Further Literature

In case you want to brush up on liberalism and neorealism, I suggest you read the following:

- Nye, J. (1988). Neorealism and Neoliberalism. *World Politics*, 40(2), 235-251.

To point you to some other literature that is related to bargaining theory, be it in international cooperation, war, civil war or terrorism, consider the following:

- Little, A., Zeitzoff, T. (2017). A Bargaining Theory of Conflict with Evolutionary Preferences. *International Organization*, 71(3), 523-557.
- Sechser, T. S. (2018). Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(2), 318–345.
- Rathbun, B. C. (2017). Subvert the dominant paradigm: a critical analysis of rationalism’s status as a paradigm of International Relations. *International Relations*, 31(4), 403–425.
- Gartzke, E., Poast, P. (2017). Empirically Assessing the Bargaining Theory of War: Potential and Challenges. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.
- Hartzell, C. (2017). Bargaining Theory, Civil War Outcomes, and War Recurrence: Assessing the Results of Empirical Tests of the Theory. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

If you are interested in bargaining and terrorism, you might want to look at the following classic article by Pape (2003). He shows why suicide terrorism may not be irrational for those committing suicide terrorist attacks. This strategic logic can help embed these question in a bargaining narrative.

- Pape, R. (2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(3), 343-361.

Session 3: Selectorate Theory

Introduction of Selectorate Theory and a first introduction to democratic determinants of international cooperation.

The article by Morrow et al. (2008) is mandatory, please pick one of the other two. Of course you are free to read all three articles!

- Morrow, J., De Mesquita, B., Siverson, R., Smith, A. (2008). Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy. *American Political Science Review*, 102(3), 393-400.
- Cazals, A. Sauquet, A. (2015). How do elections affect international cooperation? Evidence from environmental treaty participation. *Public Choice*. 162: 263.
- Mansfield, E. D., Milner H., and Rosendorff P. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 56(3): 477-513.

Further Literature

On Selectorate Theory:

- Arena, P., Nicoletti, N. (2014). Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision. *International Theory*, 6(3), 391-416.
- Bueno De Mesquita, B., Koch, M. T., Siverson, R. M. (2004). Testing Competing Institutional Explanations of the Democratic Peace: The Case of Dispute Duration. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 21(4), 255–267.
- Gallagher, M. and Hanson, J. (2015). Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectorate Theory for Autocracies. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2015 18:1, 367-385
- Kennedy, R. (2009). Survival and Accountability: An Analysis of the Empirical Support for “Selectorate Theory”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 53, Issue 3, 695–714.
- Xun, C., Ward, H.(2015). Winning Coalition Size, State Capacity, and Time Horizons: An Application of Modified Selectorate Theory to Environmental Public Goods Provision, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 59, Issue 2, 264–279.
- Bueno De Mesquita, B., Smith A. (2015) Tanzania’s Economic and Political Performance: A District-Level Test of Selectorate Theory. In: Wolf S. et al. (eds) *Politics in South Asia*. Springer, Cham.

On electoral cycles:

- Allan, D. (2000). The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years. *NBER Macroeconomics Annual* 15, 75-117.
- McCallum, B. (1978). The Political Business Cycle: An Empirical Test. *Southern Economic Journal*, 44(3), 504-515.
- Dubois, E. (2016). Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus. *Public Choice*. 166: 235.

Session 4: International Organizations I

Why do states cooperate through formal organizations?

- Abbott, K., and Snidal, D. (1998). Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1): 3-32.
- Vreeland, J. (2008). Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter Into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. *International Organization* 62 (1): 65-101.

Further Literature:

- Šabič Z. (2008). Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions, *Parliamentary Affairs*, Volume 61, Issue 2, 255–271.
- Nielson, D., Tierney, M. (2003). Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization*, 57(2), 241-276.
- Bailey, M., Strezhnev, A., Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(2), 430–456.

Session 5: International Organizations II

How do states design international organizations? Why do intergovernmental organizations allow non-governmental actors?

- Koremenos, B. Lipson C., and Snidal, D. (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55(4), 761-799.
- Tallberg, J., Sommerer, T., Squatrito, T., Jönsson, C. (2014). Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 68(4), 741-774.

Further Literature:

- Abbott, K., Green, J., Keohane, R. (2016). Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance. *International Organization*, 70(2), 247-277.

Session 6: International Organizations III

How does cooperation in international organizations affect domestic politics? Can cooperation influence the diffusion of Human Rights? Does cooperation lead to democratization?

- Greenhill, B. (2010). The company you keep: International socialization and the diffusion of human rights norms. In: *International studies quarterly* 54(1), 127–145.
- Pevehouse, J. (2002). Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. *International Organization* 56(3), 515–49.

Further Literature:

- Fang, S., and Stone R. (2012). International Organizations as Policy Advisors. *International Organization* 66: 537–69.

Session 7: International Agreements I

Why do states cooperate through bilateral or multilateral agreements? What are the domestic incentives of cooperation? Do democracies cooperate more?

- Kinne, B. (2013). Network Dynamics and the Evolution of International Cooperation. *American Political Science Review*, 107(4), 766-785.
- Mansfield, E., Milner, H., and Rosendorff, P. (2002). Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 56(3), 477-513.

Further Literature:

- Mansfield, E. D., Milner H., and Rosendorff P.B. (2000). Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade. *American Political Science Review* 94(02), 305–21.
- Kucik, J., and Moraguez A. (2017). Balancing Multiple Goals: Analyzing Votes on Free Trade Agreements in the U.S. House of Representatives. *Congress and the Presidency* 44 (1), 29–54.
- Raess, D., Dür A., and Sari D. (2018). Protecting Labor Rights in Preferential Trade Agreements: The Role of Trade Unions, Left Governments, and Skilled Labor. *Review of International Organizations* 13(2), 143–62.
- Lenz, T., Bezuijen J., Hooghe L., and Marks G. (2015). Patterns of International Organization. Task Specific vs. General Purpose. *Ssrn*.
- Gillespie, A. (2002). Forum Shopping in International Environmental Law: The IWC, CITES, and the Management of Cetaceans. *Ocean Development and International Law* 33 (1), 17–56.
- Leeds, B. (1999). Domestic Political Institutions , Credible Commitments , and International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4), 979–1002.
- Mansfield, E. D. and Milner, H. (2018). The Domestic Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements in Hard Times. *World Trade Review* 17 (3), 371–403.

Session 8: International Agreements II

How do states design bilateral or multilateral agreements? When do they decide to incorporate exit mechanisms? How do domestic incentives shape treatment design?

- Baccini, L., Dür, A., Elsig, M. (2015). The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus. *International Studies Quarterly*, 59(4), 765–775.
- Kucik, J. (2012). The Domestic Politics of Institutional Design: Producer Preferences over Trade Agreement Rules. *Economics and Politics*, 24(2), 95–118.

Further Literature:

- Dür, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini, and Manfred Elsig. (2014). The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset. *Review of International Organizations* 9(3), 353–75.

- Lechner, L., and Wüthrich S. (2018). Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions, Institutional Design, and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations. *International Interactions* 44(5), 833–61.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. (2006). Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements. *Global Environmental Politics* 6(3), 72–89.
- Ringius, L., Torvanger A., and Underdal A.. (2002). Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in International Climate Policy. *International Environmental Agreements* 2(1), 1–22.

Session 9: International Agreements III

How does cooperation in international agreements affect domestic politics and economic performance?

- Büthe, T., Milner, H. V. (2008). The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: Increasing FDI through international trade agreements? *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4), 741–762.
- Yoo, I. T., Kim, I. (2016). Free trade agreements for the environment? Regional economic integration and environmental cooperation in East Asia. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 16(5), 721–738.

Further Literature:

- Baccini, L., and Urpelainen J. (2014). International Institutions and Domestic Politics: Can Preferential Trading Agreements Help Leaders Promote Economic Reform? *Journal of Politics* 76(1), 195–214.
- Allee, T. L., and Scalera, J. (2012). The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession. *International Organization* 66(2), 243–76.

Session 10: Why cooperation can fail

Why does cooperation fail? What are the determinants of cooperation failure?

- Shi, M. (2018). State withdrawal from international institutions: Changing social relations within divergent institutions. In: *International Politics*, 55(2), 221–241.
- Gray, J. (2018). Life, death, or zombie? The vitality of international organizations. In: *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(1), 1–13.

Further Literature:

- Walter S., Dinas E., Jurado I., and Konstantinidis N. (2018). Noncooperation by Popular Vote: Expectations, Foreign Intervention, and the Vote in the 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum. *International Organization* 72(04), 969–94.

Session 11: When cooperation fails - Dispute Settlement in International Relations

What happens when cooperation fails? What are legalized mechanisms of dispute settlement? How do states act when they can choose between dispute settlement arenas?

- Busch, M. (2007). Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. *International Organization*, 61(4), 735-761.
- Alter K., Gathii, J., Helfer L. (2016). Backlash against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences. *European Journal of International Law*, 27(2), 293–328.

Further Literature:

- Keohane, R., Moravcsik, A., Slaughter, A. (2007). Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational (2000). In B. Simmons R. Steinberg (Eds.), *International Law and International Relations: An International Organization Reader* (International Organization, pp. 131-156). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Session 12: Student Presentations I

During this session students will present their research ideas and receive comments by their peers.
No reading

Session 13: Student Presentations II

During this session students will present their research ideas and receive comments by their peers.
No reading

Session 14: Student Presentations III

During this session students will present their research ideas and receive comments by their peers.
No reading