

# Determinants of International Cooperation

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Student Hours: By appointment

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Class Hours: Tuesdays, 13:45-15:15

Class Room: Zoom

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## Course Description

The goal of this course is to further familiarize students with questions surrounding international cooperation. The focus lies on approaching international cooperation from a “two-level” perspective, in which governments are situated between national and international actors. Initially, we will develop an understanding of Putnam’s two-level game and look at the bargains that take place on an international and on a national level. Subsequently, we will try to answer questions revolving around the reasons for delegating to international organizations in the first place, and why there is variation in the design of international organizations. Methodologically the focus of this class will be on the intersection of formal mathematical logic and statistical analyses.

The 11 sessions of this course are structured in three blocks. First, we will discuss the “two-level game” as a theoretical foundation of scholarship on international cooperation. Then we will cover, in-depth, the international and the national levels. Finally, we will look at some of the results of international bargains, try to answer questions of institutional design and try to figure out whether the cause of cooperation failure is to be located on the national or the international level.

## Course Objectives

- Deepen your knowledge of varying forms of international cooperation with examples
- Introduce you to the analytical framework of the two-level game by Putnam (1988)
  - Enable you to critically assess cooperative regimes
- Critically read scholarly literature
- Further develop your own ideas about foreign policy
- Help you with a research project from paper idea to final product

## Organizational Information and Course Policies

### Classroom Policies and Procedures

**General:** Given the continued effects of SARS-CoV-2 the course will be taught in an online format. The course is taught in English.

**Course readings:** We do not use a single textbook for this course. Selected readings for each session will be made available on the ILIAS course page.

**E-mail:** All e-mails concerning this course will be sent to your university e-mail address (username@ mail.uni-mannheim.de) via ILIAS. Please make sure to regularly check the inbox or that e-mails get forwarded to not miss important information. When e-mailing me, please add “[HS IB HWS20]” at the beginning of the e-mail’s subject. I will try to respond in a timely fashion (48 hours or less).

**Attendance:** Even though attendance in lectures and seminars is not mandatory I strongly encourage you to regularly attend the Zoom-Sessions and try to participate.

**Technology policy:** Though this is an online class it is structured to promote discussion. If you do not have access to the technological prerequisites, please let me know and we will find a solution. Cell phones and computers can tend to obstruct attention when used inappropriately. Technology, however, can also be useful to engage with the material. I suggest responsibly using technology during the Zoom sessions. Hence, your laptop/tablet – if necessary – should only be used for note-taking and retrieving and reviewing articles.

**Students with disabilities or chronic illness:** Contact me or the Studienbüro if you need special assistance because of disabilities or chronic illness. Please do so early in the semester so we can immediately make the appropriate accommodations.

**Late work policy:** In general, I will not allow extensions on any of the assessments. Start early with them, so you do not run into time issues once the deadline approaches. However, should you find yourself in a situation where you will not be able to turn something in on time, please advise me of this as soon as you can, and *not* the day the task is due or afterwards, We will work together to come up with a solution.

**Cheating and plagiarism:** Plagiarising will lead to failing the course or expulsion from the University of Mannheim. All your submissions will be checked for plagiarism using the “Urkund”-Software.

## Assessment

**Grading policy:** The examination regulations state that course assessment consists of two components: coursework (“Studienleistungen”) and examination (“Prüfungsleistungen”). Coursework is graded as pass/fail and is defined as preliminary required (“Vorleistung”) before you can be admitted to the examination. Therefore, you must pass all coursework successfully to be able to participate in the final examination. Nonaccomplishment or failure of successful completion leads to an exclusion from the final examination and consequently to failure of this seminar. The examination requirement will be graded on a scale from 1,0 (Sehr gut) to 5,0 (nicht ausreichend) and will be the grade for the entire course.

**Studienleistung:** Studienleistungen consist of the submission of *discussion questions*, a *discussion protocol*, an *abstract*, a *research proposal*, and a *presentation of your research proposal* in the final session.

**Discussion questions:** Submit two questions that are related to the literature. Try to identify questions that scrutinize the arguments presented in the literature, or develop questions that further develop the argument. Submission can be done via e-mail.

**Discussion protocol:** In week 1 you will be assigned to a group. Each group, ideally, consists of three people. As a group, you are expected to hand in a discussion protocol of the previous

sessions (length: min. 1 page; font: Times New Roman or equivalent; font-size: 12pt; double spacing; margins: 2.5cm).

The *discussion questions* will provide the basis of the discussion in the lecture and for the discussion protocol and are a way to prepare the class.

The *discussion protocol* should summarize your efforts as a group to understand the literature and to critically assess the theories, concepts and results of the papers we will read throughout this class. Both are due every **Thursday of the week at 23:55**.

**Abstract:** Each student is required to submit an abstract on the **29.10.2020**. The abstract should encourage you to think early about your final paper. The abstract should be no longer than 200 words.

**Submission and presentation of research proposal:** You are expected to hand in a (minimum) 750-word research proposal for the term paper via ILIAS by Thursday, **November 19**. It should describe the puzzle/research question and working hypotheses.

Each student will then give a five-minute presentation of their term paper idea at a “mini-conference”. We will discuss the format of these presentations in class in Week 9 or 10. The students who are not presenting are expected to ask questions and provide constructive feedback to the presenter.

**Prüfungsleistung:** The term paper (length: 5000–6000 words, excl. figures, tables, references and appendix; font: Times New Roman or equivalent; font-size: 12pt; double spacing; margins: 2.5cm) should focus on developing a research question to answer a scientific research question concerning international cooperation. In doing so, students are expected to apply existing theories and explanations and to develop a research framework which would allow them to test their hypotheses and validate their theory. This submission will have to include a methods/research design and an analysis section. Ideally, this paper should be considered a trial-run for your BA-Thesis.

If you feel like you need help with finding or developing a topic or research question, please make an appointment for my office hours.

Term papers have to be handed in the latest by Sunday, **10.01.2021**. **The term paper has to be handed in as an electronic copy (pdf-upload via ILIAS including all additional materials**. In addition, you have to hand in a paper copy including the statutory declaration. Only after I have received the paper copy I will be able to enter your grade.) Should you fail to submit a term paper by the above-mentioned deadline or submit an insufficient term paper, you will receive the grade 5.0 (fail). It is not possible to retake the term paper since it is part of the overall assessment, which is only able to be retaken in its entirety in one of the following semesters.

## Course Structure

I expect you to prepare for class by working through the chapter(s) listed under “Required readings” for each session. The material listed under “Optional readings” can help you to gain a deeper understanding of the contents we discuss.

### Week 01 (Sep 29): Introduction, Course Organization

In the first week, we will discuss some organizational things, such as the structure of the class. In addition, we will discuss the foundations of two-level games.

#### Suggested readings:

- da Conceição-Heldt, E. (2013). Two-level games and trade cooperation: What do we now know? *International Politics*, 50(4), 579–599.
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427–460.

#### Optional readings:

**Further dates:** Oct 01: Submit *discussion questions* by 23:55.

### Week 02 (Oct 06): The systemic level (I)

In the second session, we will discuss some of the core arguments surrounding the first level of the two-level game. Namely, bargaining among states.

#### Required readings:

- Fearon, J. D. (1998). Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization*, 52(2), 269–305.
- Powell, R. (2002). Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5(1), 1–30.

#### Optional readings:

- Kotzian, P. (2007). Arguing and Bargaining in International Negotiations: On the Application of the Frame-Selection Model and its Implications. *International Political Science Review*, 28(1), 79–99.
- Morgan, T. C. (1990). Power, resolve and bargaining in international crises: A spatial theory. *International Interactions*, 15(3–4), 279–302.
- Napel, S. (2002). Essentials of Bargaining Theory. In S. Napel (Ed.), *Bilateral Bargaining: Theory and Applications* (pp. 5–79).
- Reiter, D. (2003). Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. *Perspectives on Politics*, 1(1), 27–43.

**Further dates:** Oct 08: Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* by 23:55.

### **Week 03 (Oct 13): The systemic level (II)**

In the third week, we will take a look at cooperation from emerging powers.

#### **Required readings:**

- Schirm, S. A. (2010). Leaders in need of followers: Emerging powers in global governance. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(2), 197–221.
- Kahler, M. (2013). Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo. *International Affairs*, 89(3), 711–729.

#### **Optional readings:**

- Barbosa, A. de F., Narciso, T., & Biancalana, M. (2009). Brazil in Africa: Another Emerging Power in the Continent? *Politikon*, 36(1), 59–86.
- Cornelissen, S. (2009). Awkward Embraces: Emerging and Established Powers and the Shifting Fortunes of Africa's International Relations in the Twenty-First Century. *Politikon*, 36(1), 5–26.
- Hopewell, K. (2017). The BRICS—merely a fable? Emerging power alliances in global trade governance. *International Affairs*, 93(6), 1377–1396.
- Jordaan, E. (2003). The concept of a middle power in international relations: Distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers. *Politikon*, 30(1), 165–181.
- Kenkel, K. M. (2010). South America's Emerging Power: Brazil as Peacekeeper. *International Peacekeeping*, 17(5), 644–661.
- Keukeleire, S., & Hooijmaaijers, B. (2014). The BRICS and Other Emerging Power Alliances and Multilateral Organizations in the Asia-Pacific and the Global South: Challenges for the European Union and Its View on Multilateralism. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(3), 582–599.
- Macfarlane, S. N. (2006). The 'R' in BRICs: Is Russia an emerging power? *International Affairs*, 82(1), 41–57.
- Michaelowa, K., & Michaelowa, A. (2012). India as an emerging power in international climate negotiations. *Climate Policy*, 12(5), 575–590.
- Schoeman, P. M. (2000). South Africa as an emerging middle power. *African Security Review*, 9(3), 47–58.

**Further dates:** Oct 15: Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* by 23:55.

### **Week 04 (Oct 20): The domestic level (state-centered approaches)**

In this fourth week, we will shift our focus to the national level of the two-level game. Specifically, we will look at state-centered explanations of international cooperation. We will assess why domestic institutions shape international cooperation.

#### **Required readings:**

- de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999). An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. *The American Political Science Review*, 93(4), 791–807.
- Leeds, B. A. (1999). Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 43(4), 979–1002.

**Optional readings:**

- Mansfield, E. D., & Busch, M. L. (1995). The political economy of nontariff barriers: A cross-national analysis. *International Organization*, 49(4), 723–749.
- Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (1997b). Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government As Constraints on Trade Liberalization. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(1), 117–146.
- Verdier, D. (1998). Democratic Convergence and Free Trade. *International Studies Quarterly*, 42(1), 1–24.
- Wagner, P., & Plouffe, M. (2019). Electoral systems and trade-policy outcomes: The effects of personal-vote incentives on barriers to international trade. *Public Choice*, 180(3), 333–352.

See also:

- Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2002). Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization*, 56(3), 477–513.

*We will read this text in week 6*

**Further dates:** Oct 22: Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* by 23:55. Student Questionnaire ends at 23:55.

**Week 05 (Oct 27): The domestic level (society-centered approaches)**

In the fifth week, we will take another look at the domestic level. This time we will focus on the society-centered approaches to international cooperation.

**Required readings:**

- Dür, A., & Mateo, G. (2010). Choosing a bargaining strategy in EU negotiations: Power, preferences, and culture. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(5), 680–693.
- Slantchev, B. L. (2006). Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(2), 445–477.

**Optional readings:**

- Cazals, A., & Sauquet, A. (2015). How do elections affect international cooperation? Evidence from environmental treaty participation. *Public Choice*, 162(3–4), 263–285.
- Conceição-Heldt, E. (2011) *Negotiating Trade Liberalization at the WTO: Domestic Politics and Bargaining Dynamics*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Frieden, J. (1988). Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940. *International Organization*, 42(1), 59–90.
- Gómez-Mera, L. (2009). Domestic constraints on regional cooperation: Explaining trade conflict in MERCOSUR. *Review of International Political Economy*, 16(5), 746–777.
- Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2002). *Interest Groups and Trade Policy*. Princeton University Press.
- Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. *International Organization*, 61(04).

**Further dates:** Oct 29: Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* and *abstract* by 23:55.

### **Week 06 (Nov 03): Society- vs. state-centered approaches**

In the sixth session, we will compare society- and state-centered approaches in a similar field and assess whether these can be thought of in an isolated fashion or if we have to analyze international cooperation having both in mind.

#### **Required readings:**

- Kono, D. Y. (2006). Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *The American Political Science Review*, 100(3), 369–384.
- Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2002). Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization*, 56(3), 477–513.

#### **Optional readings:**

*For further readings, see the previous two weeks.*

**Further dates:** Nov 5: Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* by 23:55.

### **Week 07 (Nov 10): Unitary actors?**

In this seventh session, we will try answer, whether it makes sense to conceive of states as unitary actors in international relations.

#### **Required readings:**

- König, T. (2018). Still the Century of Intergovernmentalism? Partisan Ideology, Two-level Bargains and Technocratic Governance in the post-Maastricht Era. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56(6), 1240–1262.
- Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 51(4), 513–553. Cambridge Core.

#### **Optional readings:**

- Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2012). Domestic Explanations of International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15(1), 161–181.

You could make the argument that the concept of winning coalitions already points toward the a non-unitary state in international relations.

- Hug, S. (1999). Nonunitary Actors in Spatial Models: How Far Is Far in Foreign Policy? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(4), 479–500.
- Kischel, U. (2001). The State as a non-unitary actor: The role of the judicial branch in international negotiations. *Archiv Des Völkerrechts*, 39(3), 268–296.

**Further dates:** Nov 12: Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* by 23:55.

### **Week 08 (Nov 17): Delegation to international organizations**

In the eighth week, we will shift towards different forms of international cooperation and try to answer, why states would delegate to international organizations in the first place.

#### **Required readings:**

- Hawkins, D., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Delegation under anarchy: States, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. In D. L. Nielson, D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (pp. 3–38). Cambridge University Press; Cambridge Core.
- Lyne, M. M., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid. In D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. L. Nielson, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (pp. 41–76). Cambridge University Press.

#### **Optional readings:**

- Bradley, C. A., & Kelley, J. G. (2008). The Concept of International Delegation. *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 71(1), 1–36.
- Dijkstra, H. (2013). Delegation and Agency in International Relations. In H. Dijkstra (Ed.), *Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense: An Institutional Perspective* (pp. 20–45). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Oppermann, K. (2008). Salience and sanctions: A principal-agent analysis of domestic winsets in two-level games—the case of British European policy under the Blair government. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 21(2), 179–197.

**Further dates:** Nov 19: Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* by, as well as your *research proposal* by 23:55.

### **Week 09 (Nov 24): The design of international institutions**

In the ninth session, we will focus on the institutional design of international regimes. We will look at different explanations for it and scrutinize rational functionalism as a key paradigm to analyze institutional design.

#### **Required readings:**

- Koremenos, B. (2016). *The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design*. Cambridge University Press.
- Voeten, E. (2019). Making Sense of the Design of International Institutions. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22(1), 147–163.

**Optional readings:**

*In general, the text by Voeten is a very good summary of the state of the art literature. You will certainly find additional literature there.*

- Blake, D. J., & Payton, A. L. (2015). Balancing design objectives: Analyzing new data on voting rules in intergovernmental organizations. *The Review of International Organizations*, 10(3), 377–402.
- Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A. H., Osterkat, S. C., Niedzwiecki, S., & Shair-Rosenfield, S. (n.d.). *Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume I*. In *Measuring Regional Authority*. Oxford University Press.
- Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization*, 55(4), 761–799.

**Further dates:** Nov 26: Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* by 23:55.

**Week 10 (Dec 01): Exit and withdrawal - when cooperation fails**

In this tenth session, we will take a look at the failure of cooperation. In this final substantive session, we will try to bring together the first and second level of the two-level game, as well as the society and state-centered arguments to figure out which level is responsible for the failure of international cooperation.

**Required readings:**

- Borzyskowski, I. von, & Vabulas, F. (2019). Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations? *The Review of International Organizations*, 14(2).
- Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: A divided nation, a divided continent. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(9), 1259–1277.

**Optional readings:**

- Gray, J. (2018). Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(1), 1–13.
- Shi, M. (2018). State withdrawal from international institutions: Changing social relations within divergent institutions. *International Politics*, 55(2), 221–241.

**Further dates:** Dec 3: Submit *discussion protocol* by 23:55.

**Week 11 (Dec 08): Student presentations**

If possible we will have a double session in this day (180 minutes instead of 90 minutes).

**Required readings:** *None*

**Optional readings:** *None*

**Further dates:** *None*




Figure 1: Structure of the Class