

Syllabus: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation

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Class Hours: Wednesday, 13:45-15:15

Class Room: Sowi-Zoom-07

Course Description

The goal of this course is to further familiarize students with questions surrounding international cooperation. The focus lies on approaching international cooperation from a “two-level” perspective, in which governments are situated between national and international actors. Initially, we will develop an understanding of Putnam’s two-level game and look at the bargains that take place on an international and on a national level. Subsequently, we will try to answer questions revolving around the reasons for delegating to international organizations or why there is variation in the design of international organizations.

The 14 sessions of this course are structured in three blocks. First, we will discuss the “two-level game” as a theoretical foundation of scholarship on international cooperation. Then we will cover, in-depth, the domestic level. Finally, we will look at some of the results of international bargains, try to answer questions of institutional design, and try to figure out whether the cause of cooperation failure is to be located on the national or the international level.

Course Objectives

- Deepen your knowledge of varying forms of international cooperation with examples
- Introduce you to the analytical framework of the two-level game by Putnam (1988)
 - Enable you to critically assess cooperative regimes
- Critically read scholarly literature
- Further, develop your own ideas about foreign policy
- Help you with a research project from paper idea to final product

Organizational Information and Course Policies

Classroom Policies and Procedures

General: Given the continued effects of SARS-CoV-2 the course will be taught in an online format. The course is taught in English.

Course readings: We do not use a single textbook for this course. Selected readings for each session will be made available on the ILIAS course page.

E-mail: All e-mails concerning this course will be sent to your university e-mail address (username@mail.uni-mannheim.de) via ILIAS. Please make sure to regularly check the inbox or that e-mails get forwarded to not miss important information. When e-mailing me, please add “[DPIC21]” at the beginning of the e-mail’s subject. I will try to respond in a timely fashion (48 hours or less).

Attendance: Even though attendance in lectures and seminars is not mandatory I strongly encourage you to regularly attend the Zoom sessions and to participate in the discussion.

Technology policy: Though this is an online class, it is structured to promote discussion. If you do not have access to the technological prerequisites, please let me know and we will find a solution. Cell phones and computers can tend to obstruct attention when used inappropriately. Technology, however, can also be useful to engage with the material. I suggest responsibly using technology during the Zoom sessions. Hence, your laptop/tablet – if necessary – should only be used for note-taking and retrieving and reviewing articles.

Students with disabilities or chronic illness: Contact me or the Studienbüro if you need special assistance because of disabilities or chronic illness. Please do so early in the semester so we can immediately make the appropriate accommodations.

Late work policy: In general, I will not allow extensions on any of the assessments. Start early with them, so you do not run into time issues once the deadline approaches. However, should you find yourself in a situation where you will not be able to turn something in on time, please advise me of this as soon as you can, and *not* the day the task is due or afterward. We will work together to come up with a solution.

Cheating and plagiarism: Plagiarising will lead to failing the course or expulsion from the University of Mannheim. All your submissions will be checked for plagiarism using the “Urkund”-Software.

Assessment

Grading policy: The examination regulations state that course assessment consists of two components: coursework (“Studienleistungen”) and examination (“Prüfungsleistungen”). Coursework is graded as pass/fail and is defined as preliminary required (“Vorleistung”) before you can be admitted to the examination. Therefore, you must pass all coursework successfully to be able to participate in the final examination. Nonaccomplishment or failure of successful completion leads to an exclusion from the final examination and consequently to failure of this seminar. The examination requirement will be graded on a scale from 1,0 (Sehr gut) to 5,0 (nicht ausreichend) and will be the grade for the entire course. Every assessment will have a dedicated assessment folder on ILIAS where you can upload your exercise.

Studienleistung: Studienleistungen consist of the submission of *discussion questions*, *discussion protocols*, an *abstract*, a *research proposal*, and a *presentation of your research proposal* in the final session.

Discussion questions: Submit two questions that are related to the literature. **Try to identify questions that scrutinize the arguments presented in the literature, or develop questions that further develop the argument.**

The *discussion questions* will provide the basis of the discussion in the lecture and for the discussion protocol and are a way to prepare the class.

Discussion protocol: In week 1 or 2 you will be assigned to a group. Each group, ideally, consists of three people. As a group, you are expected to hand in a discussion protocol of the previous sessions (length: min. 1 page; font: Times New Roman or equivalent; font-size: 12pt; double spacing; margins: 2.5cm).

The *discussion protocol* should summarize your efforts as a group to understand the literature and to critically assess the theories, concepts, and results of the papers we will read throughout this class. Both are due every **Monday of the week at 23:59**.

Research idea: Each student is required to submit a research idea on the **11.10.2021**. This should encourage you to think early about your final paper. The document should be no longer than 200 words. Ideally, you already have a topic in mind. Based on this document you will receive feedback on the feasibility and potential next steps.

Submission and presentation of research proposal: You are expected to hand in a (minimum) 750-word research proposal for the term paper via ILIAS by **15.11.2021**. It should describe the puzzle/research question and working hypotheses.

Mini-conference: At the end of this course we will have a “mini-conference”. Academic conferences allow scholars to receive feedback from their peers. This is the underlying idea of this mini-conference. The goal will be to allow you to present an academic project and receive some feedback from your peers. The final two sessions are dedicated to the “conference”. However, as in any conference, you need to submit something first. While conferences often require abstracts or entire papers, we will follow have a slightly different process. Throughout the semester you will submit a research idea (**11.10.2021**) and a research proposal (**15.11.2021**). I will give you feedback on both. For the mini-conference, we will have discussants who will give you additional feedback based on your research proposal. You will also have the chance to get feedback from your peers.

Prüfungsleistung: The term paper (length: 6000 words (+/- 10 percent), excl. figures, tables, references, and appendix; font: Times New Roman or equivalent; font-size: 12pt; double spacing; margins: 2.5cm) should focus on developing a research question to answer a scientific research question concerning international cooperation. In doing so, students are expected to apply existing theories and explanations and to develop a research framework that would allow them to test their hypotheses and validate their theory. This submission will have to include a methods/research design and an analysis section. Ideally, this paper should be considered a trial run for your BA-Thesis. **Papers will only be accepted in .pdf format!**

If you feel like you need help with finding or developing a topic or research question, please make an appointment for my office hours.

Term papers have to be handed in at the latest by Monday, **17.01.2022**. **The term paper has to be handed in as an electronic copy (pdf-upload via ILIAS including all additional materials)**. In addition, you have to hand in a paper copy including the statutory declaration. Only after I have received the paper copy I will be able to enter your grade. Should you fail to submit a term paper by the above-mentioned deadline or submit an insufficient term paper, you will receive the grade 5.0 (fail). It is not possible to retake the term paper since it is part of the overall assessment, which is only able to be retaken in its entirety in one of the following semesters.

Course Structure

I expect you to prepare for class by working through the papers listed under “Required readings” for each session. The material listed under “Optional readings” can help you to gain a deeper understanding of the contents we discuss and usually is a good starting point for the final paper.

Week 01 (Sep 08): Introduction, Course Organization

In the first week, we will discuss some organizational things, such as the structure of the class or the course requirements. I will also assign the groups.

Suggested readings:

- Fearon, J. D. (1998). Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization*, 52(2), 269–305.
- Powell, R. (2002). Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5(1), 1–30.

Further dates: Sep 13 - Submit *discussion questions* by 23:59.

Week 02 (Sep 15): The Design of International Institutions

We will focus on the institutional design of international regimes. We will look at different explanations for it and scrutinize rational functionalism as a key paradigm to analyze the institutional design.

Required readings:

- Koremenos, B. (2016). *The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design*. Cambridge University Press.
- Voeten, E. (2019). Making Sense of the Design of International Institutions. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22(1), 147–163.

Optional readings:

In general, the text by Voeten is a very good summary of the state-of-the-art literature. You will certainly find additional literature there.

- Blake, D. J., & Payton, A. L. (2015). Balancing design objectives: Analyzing new data on voting rules in intergovernmental organizations. *The Review of International Organizations*, 10(3), 377–402.
- Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A. H., Osterkat, S. C., Niedzwiecki, S., & Shair-Rosenfield, S. (n.d.). *Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume I*. In *Measuring Regional Authority*. Oxford University Press.
- Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization*, 55(4), 761–799.

Further dates: Sep 20 - Submit *discussion protocol* by 23:59.

Week 03 (Sep 22): Delegation to International Organizations

We will shift towards different forms of international cooperation and try to answer, why states would delegate to international organizations in the first place. Following the literature of the previous weeks, we want to understand who is delegating and why it matters to understand cooperative outcomes. In randomized groups, you will try to develop a delegation chain.

Required readings:

- Hawkins, D., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Delegation under anarchy: States, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. In D. L. Nielson, D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (pp. 3–38). Cambridge University Press; Cambridge Core.
- Lyne, M. M., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid. In D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. L. Nielson, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (pp. 41–76). Cambridge University Press.

Optional readings:

- Bradley, C. A., & Kelley, J. G. (2008). The Concept of International Delegation. *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 71(1), 1–36.
- Dijkstra, H. (2013). Delegation and Agency in International Relations. In H. Dijkstra (Ed.), *Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense: An Institutional Perspective* (pp. 20–45). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Oppermann, K. (2008). Salience and sanctions: A principal-agent analysis of domestic wins in two-level games—the case of British European policy under the Blair government. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 21(2), 179–197.

Further dates: Sep 27 - Submit *discussion questions* by 23:59.

Week 04 (Sep 29): The Two-Level Game as a Framework for Analysis

We will discuss some of the core arguments surrounding the two-level game and discuss why it is useful to understand international cooperative outcomes.

Required readings:

- da Conceição-Heldt, E. (2013). Two-level games and trade cooperation: What do we now know? *International Politics*, 50(4), 579–599.
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427–460.

Optional readings:

- da Conceição, E. (2010). Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48(4), 1107–1126.
- da Conceição-Heldt, E., & Mello, P. A. (2017). Two-level games in Foreign Policy Analysis. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

- Sebenius, J. K. (2013). Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its “Behind-the-Table” Challenges. *Negotiation Journal*, 29(1), 7–21.

Further dates: Oct 04 - Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* by 23:59. Student Questionnaire ends at 23:59.

Week 05 (Oct 06): The Domestic Level (State-Centered Approaches)

We will look at institutional explanations of international cooperation.

Required readings:

- de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999). An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. *The American Political Science Review*, 93(4), 791–807.
- Wagner, P., & Plouffe, M. (2019). Electoral systems and trade-policy outcomes: The effects of personal-vote incentives on barriers to international trade. *Public Choice*, 180(3), 333–352.

Optional readings:

- Leeds, B. A. (1999). Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 43(4), 979–1002.
- Mansfield, E. D., & Busch, M. L. (1995). The political economy of nontariff barriers: A cross-national analysis. *International Organization*, 49(4), 723–749.
- Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (1997b). Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government As Constraints on Trade Liberalization. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(1), 117–146.
- Verdier, D. (1998). Democratic Convergence and Free Trade. *International Studies Quarterly*, 42(1), 1–24.

Further dates: Oct 11 - Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* and *research idea* by 23:59.

Week 06 (Oct 13): The Domestic Level (Society-Centered Approaches)

We will take a look at another aspect of the domestic level. This time we will focus on the society-centered approaches to international cooperation. We will discuss how domestic societal conflict can affect international outcomes.

Required readings:

- Cazals, A., & Sauquet, A. (2015). How do elections affect international cooperation? Evidence from environmental treaty participation. *Public Choice*, 162(3–4), 263–285.
- Eliasson, L. J., & Huet, P. G.-D. (2018). TTIP negotiations: Interest groups, anti-TTIP civil society campaigns, and public opinion. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 16(2), 101–116.

Optional readings:

- Conceição-Heldt, E. (2011) *Negotiating Trade Liberalization at the WTO: Domestic Politics and Bargaining Dynamics*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dür, A., & Mateo, G. (2010). Choosing a bargaining strategy in EU negotiations: Power, preferences, and culture. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(5), 680–693.
- Slantchev, B. L. (2006). Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(2), 445–477.
- Frieden, J. (1988). Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940. *International Organization*, 42(1), 59–90.
- Gómez-Mera, L. (2009). Domestic constraints on regional cooperation: Explaining trade conflict in MERCOSUR. *Review of International Political Economy*, 16(5), 746–777.
- Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2002). *Interest Groups and Trade Policy*. Princeton University Press.
- Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. *International Organization*, 61(04).

Further dates: Oct 18 - Submit *discussion protocol* and *abstract* by 23:59.

Week 07 (Oct 20): Does the Audience Matter? (I)

In this week we will discuss whether domestic audiences matter. Each group will read two texts and prepare a presentation. The length of the presentations will be determined by the number of groups.

Required readings:

- Brown, J. N., & Marcum, A. S. (2011). Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy. *Security Studies*, 20(2), 141–170.
- Chiozza, G. (2017). Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 34(1), 3–26.
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *The American Political Science Review*, 88(3), 577–592.
- Gartzke, E., & Lupu, Y. (2012). Still Looking for Audience Costs. *Security Studies*, 21(3), 391–397.
- Levendusky, M. S., & Horowitz, M. C. (2012). When backing down is the right decision: Partisanship, new information, and audience costs. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(2), 323–338.
- Moon, C., & Souva, M. (2016). Audience Costs, Information, and Credible Commitment Problems. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(3), 434–458.
- Potter, P. B. K., & Baum, M. A. (2010). Democratic Peace, Domestic Audience Costs, and Political Communication. *Political Communication*, 27(4), 453–470.
- Schultz, K. A. (1998). Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises. *The American Political Science Review*, 92(4), 829–844.

- Slantchev, B. L. (2006). Politicians, the media, and domestic audience costs. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(2), 445–477.
- Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. *International Organization*, 61(04).
- Trachtenberg, M. (2012). Audience costs: An historical analysis. *Security Studies*, 21(1), 3–42.
- Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. *International Organization*, 35–64.

Further dates: *none*

Week 08 (Oct 27): Does the Audience Matter? (II)

Student presentations of their audience costs projects. No readings this week.

Required readings: *None*

Optional readings: *None*

Further dates: Nov 01 - Submit *discussion questions* by 23:59.

Week 09 (Nov 03): Voters, Interest Groups, and Political Parties

We will try to answer, how we can conceive of domestic influences. Whose interests matter when it comes to foreign-policy making?

Required readings:

- König, T. (2018). Still the Century of Intergovernmentalism? Partisan Ideology, Two-level Bargains and Technocratic Governance in the post-Maastricht Era. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56(6), 1240–1262.
- Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 51(4), 513–553. Cambridge Core.

Optional readings:

- Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2012). Domestic Explanations of International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15(1), 161–181.

You could make the argument that the concept of winning coalitions already points toward a non-unitary state in international relations.

- Hug, S. (1999). Nonunitary Actors in Spatial Models: How Far Is Far in Foreign Policy? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(4), 479–500.
- Kischel, U. (2001). The State as a non-unitary actor: The role of the judicial branch in international negotiations. *Archiv Des Völkerrechts*, 39(3), 268–296.

Further dates: Nov 08 - Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* by 23:59.

Week 10 (Nov 10): Coalition Foreign Policy

We will take a closer look at the influence of parties in international cooperation and assess two competing explanations of coalition behavior.

Required readings:

- Oktay, S. (2014). Constraining or enabling? The effects of government composition on international commitments. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(6), 860–884.
- Kaarbo, J., & Beasley, R. K. (2008). Taking It to the Extreme: The Effect of Coalition Cabinets on Foreign Policy. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 4(1), 67–81.

Optional readings:

- Clare, J. (2010). Ideological Fractionalization and the International Conflict Behavior of Parliamentary Democracies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(4), 965–987.
- Joly, J., & Dandoy, R. (2018). Beyond the Water's Edge: How Political Parties Influence Foreign Policy Formulation in Belgium. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 14(4), 512–535.
- Kaarbo, J. (1996a). Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(4), 501–530.
- Kaarbo, J. (1996b). Influencing Peace: Junior Partners in Israeli Coalition Cabinets. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 31(3), 243–284.
- Kaarbo, J. (2015). A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory. *International Studies Review*, 17(2), 189–216.
- Milner, H. V., & Judkins, B. (2004). Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy? *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(1), 95–119.
- Oktay, S. (2017). Coalition Politics and Foreign Policy. In S. Oktay, *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Oppermann, K., & Brummer, K. (2014). Patterns of Junior Partner Influence on the Foreign Policy of Coalition Governments. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 16(4), 555–571.
- Wagner, W., Herranz-Surrallés, A., Kaarbo, J., & Ostermann, F. (2018). Party politics at the water's edge: Contestation of military operations in Europe. *European Political Science Review*, 10(4), 537–563.

Further dates: Nov 15 - Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol*, as well as your *research proposal* by 23:59.

Week 11 (Nov 17): Populism and Globalization Backlash

Sessions eleven and twelve are dedicated to the failure of cooperation. In session eleven we will take a look at populism and foreign policy.

Required readings:

- Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rudra, N. (2021). The Globalization Backlash: Exploring New Perspectives. *Comparative Political Studies*, 00104140211024286.
- Verbeek, B., & Zaslove, A. (2017). *Populism and Foreign Policy* (C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy, Eds.; Vol. 1). Oxford University Press.

Optional readings:

Further dates: Nov 22 - Submit *discussion questions* and *discussion protocol* by 23:59.

Week 12 (Nov 24): International Disintegration

We will take a look at the failure of cooperation. In this final substantive session, we will try to bring together the first and second levels of the two-level game, as well as the society and state-centered arguments to figure out which level is responsible for the failure of international cooperation.

Required readings:

- Borzyskowski, I. von, & Vabulas, F. (2019). Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations? *The Review of International Organizations*, 14(2).
- Shi, M. (2018). State withdrawal from international institutions: Changing social relations within divergent institutions. *International Politics*, 55(2), 221–241.

Optional readings:

- Gray, J. (2018). Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(1), 1–13.
- Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: A divided nation, a divided continent. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(9), 1259–1277.

Further dates: Nov 29 - Submit *discussion protocol* by 23:59.

Week 13 (Dec 01): Mini Conference

Students will be given the space and time to present their research projects and receive feedback on their courses.

Required readings: *None*

Optional readings: *None*

Further dates: *None*

Week 14 (Dec 08): Mini Conference

Students will be given the space and time to present their research projects and receive feedback on their courses.

Required readings: *None*

Optional readings: *None*

Further dates: *None*