The goal of this course is to further familiarize students with questions surrounding international cooperation. The focus lies on approaching international cooperation from a “two-level” perspective, in which governments are situated between national and international actors. Initially, we will develop an understanding of Putnam’s two-level game and look at the bargains that take place on an international and on a national level. Subsequently, we will try to answer questions revolving around the reasons for delegating to international organizations in the first place, and why there is variation in the design of international organizations. Methodologically the focus of this class will be on the intersection of formal mathematical logic and statistical analyses.
Course Structure and Objectives
The 11 sessions of this course are structured in three blocks. First, we will discuss the “two-level game” as a theoretical foundation of scholarship on international cooperation. Then we will cover, in-depth, the international and the national levels. Finally, we will look at some of the results of international bargains, try to answer questions of institutional design and try to figure out whether the cause of cooperation failure is to be located on the national or the international level.
- Deepen your knowledge of varying forms of international cooperation with examples
- Introduce you to the analytical framework of the two-level game by Putnam (1988)
- Enable you to critically assess cooperative regimes
- Critically read scholarly literature
- Further develop your own ideas about foreign policy
- Help you with a research project from paper idea to final product